Australia’s democracy, and the ‘frog in the pot’ problem
by Kate Griffiths
One of the fundamental challenges for any democracy is how to bring people together from all walks of life to share and debate ideas, build consensus, make decisions, and continue to move forward constructively together. Discussing this challenge, and many others, at a recent policy dialogue on the Conditions for a Successful Democracy hosted by the Robert Menzies Institute, I was struck by two things.
First, that the policy dialogue itself was an elegant microcosm of some of the challenges we were discussing. Could 40 or so thought-leaders with different – often opposing – perspectives reach consensus on anything? Second, that yes we could!
There was in fact a remarkable level of consensus on both the strengths of Australia’s democracy and on some of the emerging risks. On a wide range of indicators, Australia’s democratic institutions out-perform many of our international peers. And that matters because our institutions are a key determinant of our prosperity: they underpin our living standards, support and shape the economy, secure our rights and freedoms, and enable us to make collective decisions about the type of society we want to build.
There was a strong sense in the room that Australia’s democracy is largely healthy and resilient (and what a privilege that is). But there was also recognition of various risks for our democracy, and the ‘frog in the pot’ problem – that democratic erosion may not be perceived until it is too late.
While Australia sits above the OECD average on most dimensions of trust in government, trust in government in Australia is still worryingly low. Australians need to be confident in the institutions that govern them, yet less than half of Australians trust the government to ‘do what is right’, and 70 per cent think people in government look after themselves.
Australia’s democratic institutions aren’t working for everyone. Trust in government and satisfaction with democracy are typically lower among groups who are less well served by the status quo: including young people, but also women, people on lower incomes, and people living in regional areas. Collectively that means there are a lot of people who may not feel well-served by our democracy (no matter how world-leading it might be).
Migrants are an interesting exception here. Migrants (except for those from the UK) are typically more trusting than people born in Australia, despite the disadvantages they often face living in Australia. This may, at least in part, be due to direct experience with other systems.
Polarisation is present in Australia on specific issues, but generally lower here than in other democracies. Surveys in the lead up to the 2025 federal election showed an electorate that is ‘neither deeply polarised nor highly enthusiastic, but instead uncertain, ambivalent, and shaped by broader moods of optimism and pessimism’.
Perhaps the biggest risk for Australian democracy is what’s going on globally right now. We live in particularly uncertain times (the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index has been off the charts in 2025) – geopolitical tensions are very high, long-standing international rules and norms are being questioned, and we are seeing more and more extreme weather events. There is the real possibility of a major shock or disruption around the corner.
Now there’s nowhere I’d rather be in a crisis than in Australia, but Australians usually turn to government in a crisis – so that’s a big moment to build trust or to lose it.
While those of us at the policy dialogue were able to agree on many of these emerging risks, where reasonable minds differed was on how worried we should be, and what sorts of preventative action we should pursue. Which reforms would help Australia to further strengthen its democratic resilience? What safeguards are we missing? And how can we create a healthier public sphere to be able to debate and answer these questions?
We didn’t land solutions (and to be fair, that wasn’t the goal). But we did build greater consensus on the problems and risks, which is more than half the battle. Australia’s growing intergenerational divide – in trust and fortunes – tells us that tackling intergenerational inequality must be a priority for strengthening democratic resilience.
Likewise, we need better ways of engaging other groups who feel left behind or disconnected. We need to be able to talk to each other and build on shared values. Citizen assemblies and deliberations can help facilitate these conversations. And communal, trusted sources of information are important.
We need healthy public debate, a healthy public sphere. We need more people engaged in politics and standing for office. And we need to continue to build confidence in our democratic institutions, while maintaining room for healthy scepticism and honest questioning.
Strengthening our democratic resilience is a collective, ongoing challenge – not an end state – and one I am heartened to see Australian thought-leaders embrace.